From Tranquil Engagement to Ruptured Relations: The Impact of Africa’s Integration Project 2030 on International Relations of Africa

Temitope Peter Ola
Lecturer,
McPherson University,
Ogun State, Nigeria.
E-mail: olatemitope33@gmail.com

The paper examines the international relations of Africa from the integration perspective. In doing so, it is necessary to revisit the conceptual and historical issues behind the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), noting the compromises involved. The emergence of the African Union (AU) and the target set between 2004 and 2030 as the year for full integration of African countries are also examined. The paper further discusses the obstacles to the realization of a United States of Africa government, and outlines why it is not working. Three different explanations are given against the backdrop of AU’s inability to attain supra-nationalism. It is noted that the political economy cost of surrendering national sovereignty, absence of credible leadership, and poor timing are working against the timetable for 2030.

Introduction

What level of progress has been made on the continent-wide integration project in Africa? How prepared are African states to surrender aspects of their sovereignty to the African Union (AU) in line with the requirements for regional integration? What type of continental cooperation befits the aspirations of African states? These questions define the trajectory of continental government in Africa, which is the subject of this paper, because they articulate arguably the three most important impetuses to the international relations of Africa since colonial days, namely, self-determination, economic development, and African solidarity and identity. Perhaps, there is no better time to address these questions than in the present context of African states’ persistent economic difficulties, growing instability across African regions and the ongoing transmutation of African unity.

To begin with, exploring these central questions requires existing knowledge about African unity, particularly contemporary assessment of that unity. This is the first trajectory of analysis that this paper pursues. Surely, there have been several studies of African unity, a good number of them coming within the past decade, when the question of integration within the defunct OAU became increasingly central at many meetings of the organs of the organization. It is particularly germane to look at these studies not only to see how unity has evolved in Africa over the years, but also because they will provide the principal raw materials to enable us to establish the contours of the future of continental integration in the AU.

The pervasive concern with continental integration instantiates a dominant proclivity among policymakers in Africa that formation of a supranational organization is the best, if not the only guarantee to Africa’s unity. This seems like a fundamental departure from the OAU characteristic orientation of minimalist constructive engagement. To be sure, this change in orientation seems to pervade the transmutation of OAU to AU. Consequently, to effectively analyze and situate the future of supra-nationalism in Africa, it is important to understand this seeming transformation in international relations of Africa, a transformation which has led increasingly to pursuing African diplomacy in a manner that tilts more in favor of maximalist United States of African government than its declared respect for the sanctity of the independent status of African states. This is the second strand of analysis that this paper pursues.

The final set of concerns that this paper sets itself is a prognostic analysis of the future of supra-nationalism in Africa given the realities of its political economy, which is complexly interfaced with its diversity and differences, as well as a dynamic international environment. Our methodology in doing this is simple normative analysis.

Extant Knowledge on African Unity

The OAU grew out of the Pan-African struggle, for which many African leaders, politicians, scholars and ordinary people contributed. The OAU was, at the time, the most significant result of Pan-Africanism. George Shepperson, in his “Notes on Negro American Influences on the Emergence of African Nationalism”, states that Pan-Africanism was “a gift of the New World of America to the Old World of Africa”.1 This implies that the movement is not recent in origin. The impact was felt by Africans on the Continent and in the Diaspora. In this regard, three factors influenced the movement and encouraged the various resistant movements and organizations which sought to restore the status and dignity of Africans in Africa as well as those of the Diasporas who have sought to rise from centuries of degradation, which began with the transatlantic slave trade. These include slave trade, imperialism in Africa (often called colonialism) and racism and race consciousness. The first two factors combined to give the third one the push that propelled Africans at home and abroad to rebel against the conduct of western Europeans. This is why the evolution of Pan-Africanism was at times stormy and militant against imperialism and racism, which was a dominant factor in the struggle.2 At the initial stages, there were different opinions, which led to the formation of five groups. These were the Casablanca, the Brazzaville, the Pan-African Movement, the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East Central and Southern Africa (PAFMESCA) and the Monrovia group.

Alli3 notes that after the independence of Ghana in 1957, and with the radical nationalist orientation of President Kwame Nkrumah, there appeared contradictions in the dynamics of Pan-African expression in intra-African relations. In Alli’s4 view, that contradiction led to the division of African states into two camps, one radical, led by Nkrumah and later known as the Casablanca Group (which comprised Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Ghana, Libya, Morocco, and Mali), with a maximalist conception of African unity, calling for a continental United States of Africa government; while the other was conservative, and known as the Monrovia Group (which included Ethiopia, Liberia, and Nigeria, and most of the former French colonies), with a minimalist conception of African unity, accepting only a functional cooperation framework. Alli5 further argues that the future pattern of intra-African engagement dominated deliberations at several African Peoples Conferences of 1958 and 1959.

Meanwhile, from 1960, the conferences were convened as Conferences of Independent African States. At the 1962 conference of the Casablanca and Monrovia Groups, the differences between the two groups were resolved. This paved the way for designation of a blueprint document for the new organization drawing extensively on the Charter of the Inter-African and Malagasy Organization which was set up in January 1962. Finally, at the Addis Ababa Summit of Independent African States of May 25, 1963, a consensus was reached to adopt ‘functional cooperation’ as opposed to a United States of Africa government framework. That decision paved the way for the adoption of a blueprint which became known as the Charter of the OAU and the establishment of the organization, with 32 signatory governments as the vehicle for the promotion and management of intra-African relations. Aluko6 notes that 90% of the Charter of the OAU is made up of materials from the Charter of the Monrovia bloc. Akindele7 believed that the existence of the OAU concretized and infused a more certain meaning into the concept of African identity. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the OAU was a compromise among African groups. The organization was, therefore, struggling with the problems of cohesion and disarticulated institution building.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the founding of the OAU was an apparent triumph for Africa in spite of all odds.8 In consonance with the desire of the African leaders, the OAU had the following primary aims:

• To promote the unity and solidarity of the African states and act as a collective voice for the African continent. This was important to secure Africa’s long-term economic and political future.
• To coordinate and intensify the cooperation of African states in order to achieve a better life for the people of Africa.
• To defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of African states.
• The OAU was also dedicated to the eradication of all forms of colonialism, as, when it was established, there were several states that had not yet won their independence or were under minority rule.

But in 1997, the OAU members established the African Economic Community (AEC), envisioned as an African Common Market. The AEC signed an agreement with the regional African economic groupings that was expected to lead to the harmonization of policies of the common market. A more radical expansion and transformation of the OAU was adopted at Lomé, Togo, in 2000, in the form of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) which replaced the OAU in 2002.9 The AU has greater powers to promote African economic, social, and political integration, and a stronger commitment to democratic principle.

Studies on the integration process in Africa show that the objective of AU is part of Africans’ ambition to build an integrated, prosperous and peaceful continent that is driven and managed by its own citizens in the global arena. The literature also shows that Africa continues to be haunted by leadership problems10 as well as policy somersaults, all of which threaten the actualization of the three stages of continental integration set out in AU. A central concern of this paper is the future of the integration project of Africa given the existing national, sub-regional and continental realities, including the AU itself. This is one dimension that is hardly addressed by extant literature. Even on the issue of Africa’s quest for continent-wide integration, extant discourse does not demonstrate why it should outweigh all other planks of engagement between African states. For instance, why is continental integration more important than pursuing issues of improved economic and social development of Africa, small arms, migration, good governance in a manner that benefits Africans, reducing the causes of intra-state conflict, or a fully development-oriented continental body, all of which have far-reaching implications for Africa. Perhaps if such a perspective is undertaken, it might be discovered that a supra-national organization is not the be all and end all.

The Provisions of the African Union

In paragraph 8(ii) of the Sirte Declaration of July 11, 2000, African Heads of State and Government mandated the AU to advance continental unity in this way:

1. Establish an African Union in conformity with the ultimate objectives of the Charter of our Continental Organization (OAU) and the provisions of the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community.
2. Accelerate the process of implementing the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, in particular
   1. Shorten the implementation periods of the Abuja Treaty;
   2. Ensure the speedy establishment of all institutions provided for in the Abuja Treaty; such as the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Union, the African Court of Justice and, in particular the Pan-African Parliament. (We aim to establish the Parliament by the year 2000, to provide a common platform for our peoples and their grassroots organizations to be more involved in discussions and decision-making on the problems and challenges facing our continent.)
   3. Strengthening and consolidating the Regional Economic Communities as the pillars for achieving the objectives of the African Economic Community and realizing the envisaged (African) Union.¹¹

On July 11, 2002, the 36th Ordinary Summit of the now defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU), sitting in Lome, Togo, launched the African Union (AU) into existence. Contained in the Constitutive Act of the African Union adopted by the 36th Ordinary Summit of the now defunct OAU on July 11, 2000 was a plan for continental integration. The plan includes, in Articles 17 and 18 of the Act, the establishment of the following institutions:

• The Assembly of the Union;
• The Executive Council;
• The Pan-African Parliament;
• The Court of Justice;
• The Commission;
• The Permanent Representative Council;
• The Specialized Technical Committees;
• The Economic, Social and Cultural Council; and
• The Financial Institutions.¹²

Two years after that epochal event, in July 2004, the Union’s Commission submitted a timetable for full integration to the AU Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The AU Commission proposed three stages of integration:

1. The short term – 2004 to 2007, during which all the established institutions for integration are to be consolidated. Thereafter, human capacity building would be undertaken, and a continent-wide network of relations between persons and institutions are to be forged;
2. The medium term – 2007 to 2015, during which regional economic communities are to come together in an inter-regional cooperation arrangement in which all their programs and policies are to be synchronized and integrated with no barriers between them; and
3. The final stage – 2015 to 2030, the successful completion of the two previous stages should smoothly lead to this final stage of full continental integration like in the European Union (EU).

The continuous desire for a full continent-wide integration of Africa is novel as Africa has never been a single united entity. There are at least two broad worlds in Africa. There is the Arab world divide with Pan-Arabism as its fulcrum, and there is the black world of ‘Southern Heartland’13 or sub-Sahara Africa. These two worlds and peoples, though, are on the same pedestal of shared experiences of conquests, colonial rule, and imperial boundaries. In this setting, they also share a diplomatic environment defined by its large number (the largest in the world) of small weak states. But then, the ‘black’ (i.e., Southern Heartland or sub-Sahara Africa) world stands apart and unique in the world for its vulnerability to constant humiliations due to a background of slavery (which the Arabs did not experience themselves but which they visited on black Africa), and general racial distance from the other people. In sum, unlike Arab Africa, black Africa alone bears the burden of slavery, segregation, apartheid, and the general grind of racial humiliation. Thus, the integration process would present a common front to break down the historic barriers between, for instance, the francophone, Lusophone, Anglophone and Arabic-speaking African states. It would also give Africa a stronger negotiating position and united voice on the global stage.

The Problems with African Union’s Integration Project

Following the establishment of the OAU in 1963, there ensued what can be described as years of tranquil political and beneficial economic relations between and among African states. On the political front, the institutional structures for managing relations; i.e., Council of Heads of State and Government, Council of Ministers, the Secretariat, under the Charter of the OAU were quickly established. The renewed emphasis on the promotion of a Union of Africa had its impact on the hitherto tranquil political and beneficial economic relations between and among African states. After the warm and relatively cordial relations between and among African states under the OAU, the state of relations under the AU could be said to be, so far, lukewarm. And this is possibly attributable to the supranational agenda of the AU. The regional integration, as envisaged by the Constitutive Act of the African Union14 requires that member states relinquish some aspects of their much cherished and hard earned sovereignty. Thus, while the defunct OAU stands for unity (not union) among sovereign and independent African states, the AU aims at political union. Though relations are not at their best, it is still politically good in the sense that there have not been adverse developments. However, a germane point to note is that though the relations are politically good, there appears to be obstacles at the union level as it has been impossible for the AU to consolidate itself at the level of implementation due to resistance. The reasons are not farfetched!

The most ingenious device by the humankind is the concept of nationhood. It has the ability to clothe any settlement, tribe or a territory with the garb of a legal personality to act as an equal with other state actors in the comity of nations. A country is born, and begins to obtain recognition once it acquires this magic wand. Having obtained their independence and sovereignty through peace, war or agitation by self or through the assistance of other states or of the international community, African states place high premium on them. This perhaps explains the reluctance of majority of African states to make haste towards continental integration.

A number of African states are worried about the slow pace of continental integration. To them, the gradualist approach amount to foot-dragging. Others are worried about losing their much cherished independence to a continental government. Even those who understand that continental integration patterned after the EU does not transfer sovereignty to a continental government in all matters, are still hesitant in ratifying some AU protocols such as the Pan-African Parliament which are desiderata for the consolidation of continental integration. Some states are bothered by the implications of certain Articles of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, especially in the context of a central government that may decide to enforce those principles which derogate from the sovereignty of Member States such as:

1. Article 4(h) – “The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”;
2. Article 4(j) – “The right of Member States to request intervention from the Union, in order to restore peace and security”;
3. Article 4(o) – “Respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities”;
4. Article 4(p) – “Condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government”; and
5. Article 23(2) – “Any Member that fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union may be subjected to other sanctions, such as the denial of transport and communications links with other Member States, and other measures of a political and economic nature to be determined by the Assembly”.

It is the apprehension of African states over these Articles, among others, that holds back many AU member states from ratifying the protocol on the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community and that of the Pan-African Parliament. This is despite the fact that these are compromised documents balancing the views of those in favor and those against supranationalism. Thus, though history, nature and geography and global politics have combined in making African states natural friends, but at the same time, uneasy bedfellows. That there are problems in the integration project of the AU cannot be denied. The very first problem appears to be a general lack of trust among member states and underlying every decision is a suspicion that some interests have hijacked the continental body. For instance, at the Summit of the AU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in February 2009, Libya used its position, as the Chair of the organization, to push for the immediate formation of an AU government. About 20 of the 53 member states supported the proposal. Those countries which opposed the move opined that it was better to follow the three stage timetable earlier agreed to in 2004 noting that:

The strengthening of regional economic communities and addressing the challenges of competences of their various positions like health and infrastructure should be considered first before taking a plunge into the union government.15

These opponents of AU government believe, to wit: “Our ways worked in the past, our ways are working in the present, and our ways will work in the future”.16 Meanwhile, by the year 2017, neither the objective set out at the first stage of the integration timetable – 2004 to 2007 nor that of the second stage – 2007 to 2015 has been achieved. It seems there has always been suspicion and ill-feelings between and among African states. Most African states may desire trade, aid, and investment,17 but with a strong commitment to protect and preserve their hard-earned and much cherished independence and sovereignty.18

The post-colonial domestic challenges that are inimical to national stability and progress are still there. The challenges of both nation and state building, which African states grapple with at the time of the OAU creation, have yet to change. In fact, African people are already getting disenchanted with the failure of the establishment to win for them. So, national integration and stability are yet to be attained in most African states. Thus, without being alarmist, it seems therefore that any concrete attempt to implement the supranational provisions of the Constitutive Act of the African Union will not only damage African international relations irretrievably, but also harm diverse strategic continental partnerships.

To be sure, most African states emerged without any national development options. This is due to the coincidence of their independence with global development revolution that needs less and less of the raw materials that are their only comparative advantage. The political authority—the State—in Africa emerged from the decolonization process before and without the nation. It emerged before the development of bourgeoisie and unifying national economies. This means that most African states are children of enthusiasm for freedom rather than offsprings of middle-class prosperity. This is unlike in Europe and North America, where the nations reflect, above all, the joint emergence of a middle-class and a market of national dimensions. This is why it is impossible to replicate the developed nation-state in Africa.

The emergence of most African states is thus a consequence of the principles proclaimed by Woodrow Wilson and confirmed in the Versailles treaties concerning the right to self-determination. Wilson’s misguided idealism awoke the desire for states in Africa. Starting with Versailles, every human group in Africa felt that it had the right to become a state even though it did not constitute a true nation and lacked the economic means to develop. The emergence of states in Africa relied on the principle of self-determination as their juridical and political instrument. Its application is based on the assumption that as many states can be created as there are nationalists that wish it. The only thing needed is international recognition. While political independence gave a sense of dignity to Africans who have been victims of colonial domination, it did not create viable nation-states. Thus, at the center of African diplomatic thought was the idea of self-determination.

This principle of the United Nations Charter was applied to African colonies without concern for the social, economic, political and cultural factors that determine the development of nation-states. The European colonial powers in Africa were in a great hurry to rid themselves of the socio-political burdens caused by colonial movement fired up by nationalist ideology rather than economic and social development. Self-determination dissolution made Africans believe that development is impossible without independence, and that it did not matter that African states are born poor, international aid would bridge the development gap with the world.

Between 1945 and 1989, during the Cold War, African states took advantage of the East-West conflict. This enabled them to obtain economic aid from the power blocs. However, the end of the Cold War exposed the underlying non-viability of African states. Under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), African states are obliged to integrate into the global economy and compete with their well-developed former colonial metropoles. One major truth which the world has studiously avoided is the fact that neither the United States, nor Europe, nor Japan would have managed to develop under this sort of competition. It should be recalled that during their development processes, they protected their young industries and copied each other’s technology. But the global economic arena where African states have to operate neither allows the free movement of people in search of employment, nor allows copying of foreign technology. These fall within the strict regulations of immigration and intellectual property laws. With that, African states’ function in the global economy would consist in paying their debts, importing food, fuel, and all sorts of consumer and industrial goods, and receiving some speculative foreign investment.

Africa is well endowed with vast human and material resources that can guarantee sustainable economic growth and development. The critical economic issues concern the need to foster sustainable rapid economic growth that will cater to the needs of its large population and the imperative for proper integration of its domestic economy into the world economy in the face of increasing globalization. Overcoming the challenges of poverty, fighting corruption, meeting the basic needs of the people, inadequate and inefficient infrastructure and development of human resources and capital for sustainable growth and equity are critical social challenges.

Poverty and unemployment remain critical challenges to its efforts to enhancing the quality of life of the people. The African environment is currently under increasing threat from natural and human-induced disasters such as drought, floods and erosion. Population increase is exerting pressure on the environment. Rapid deforestation, resulting from unsustainable uses of forest resources for human survival (e.g., fuel wood and energy, housing, etc.), is a major contributing factor to land degradation. For instance, indiscriminate and inappropriate mining activities in many parts of Nigeria have left some areas of the country bare and unproductive. The attainment of a poverty-reducing, socially-equitable and environmentally sustainable national development, with emphasis on national activities, programs and initiatives that have yet to address the challenges of climate change and development, biodiversity, the land policy initiative, development of strategic agricultural commodity, food security—bridging the gap through mobilization of internal resources, technology transfer, organizational restructuring, etc. have not yet been achieved. Unfortunately, it is often a fool’s fantasy to look up to African politicians—who are embedded with corporate interests and encumbered by all kinds of agenda—to push ideas that offer deep social benefits.

Beyond the foregoing, despite the seven principles outlined in the OAU Charter, none addressed the issue of economic integration. The AU acknowledged the fact that African states have taken the wind out of the defunct OAU by creating frameworks for economic integration at the sub-regional level. Thus, the AU relies on regional organizations like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC)/Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and Southern African Development Community (SADC), to achieve its continent-wide integration. Perhaps, these organizations would help the full continent-wide integration project since the rationale for the AU, according to paragraph 5 of the Sirte Declaration, is:

As we prepare to enter the 21st century and cognizant of the challenges that will confront our continent and people we emphasize the imperative need and high sense of urgency to re-kindle the aspirations of our people for stronger unity, solidarity and cohesion in a larger community of peoples transcending cultural, ethnic and national differences.19

The relevant question here is, as presently constituted, are these organizations enough for a continent-wide integration? Even then, though many member states of each of these organizations believe in their sub-regional efforts, it has not always been successful. For instance, ECOWAS which is the largest and super economic bloc of Africa is yet to succeed in achieving economic integration in West Africa. This is despite the fact of ECOWAS being the showpiece of Nigeria’s diplomatic and financial endeavors. Surely, the organization envisaged in the AU is best built on strong institutions and committed membership. At the time the OAU was being re-clothed AU, neither institutions nor committed membership existed in Africa. African leaders did not realize that a new organization does not necessarily translate or guarantee a new life for Africa. Generally speaking, African states’ relations with the AU are comparatively markedly different from that of the OAU. Most of the states seem to have resorted to a ‘wait and see’ attitude towards the AU.

It seems therefore that there was a high level of leadership insincerity in the formation of the AU. The real changes needed were left unattended while the leaders engaged themselves in shadow chasing on the continental level. Thus, the AU is a mere and wretched imitation of the European Union. The African body does not need to be patterned after the Europeans for it to function. The letters of the Constitutive Act without the spirit to fulfil it makes the document a dead letter. Contrary to conventional thinking, there was rarely anything fundamentally wrong with the OAU as it were. What was needed was the genuine commitment and cooperation of its 53 nation membership rather than the cosmetic changes being effected. It seems appropriate to state therefore that with the disposition of African states to the AU, the organization would remain on its knees.

Conclusion

Taking its point of departure from the AU gradualist timetable of between year 2004 and 2030 as the time-lag within which to achieve full regional integration, this paper reflects on the issues, prospects and challenges of political-economic integration project of Africa. By analyzing the requirements of the full regional integration timetable, the paper finds that the target of 2030 would fail because of the constraints of the social, political and economic costs-benefits of submitting state’s sovereignty to a supranational organization of Africa, while the leadership on the continent lacks the diplomatic clout, consensus, sincerity, and confidence to work at continental integration.

For the time it lasted, the OAU served the purpose of formatting African unity and an African states system with its codified rules of mutual engagement among member states, and between them as a collective and the outer, non-African, global world.20 It should be clear that molding the OAU into a ‘union’ is, in real terms, curious as it is impractical but for the captivating rhetorical flash of willingness to give up their sovereignty as a sacrifice for the greater African unity. As the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) entered into force on May 26, 2002, it provided a platform for member states to submit some aspects of their sovereignty to the AU, as part of the efforts toward continental integration in Africa. While the emphasis on regional integration promotes new thinking in African politics, it also sets a timeline for a union of African states. In the 21st century, as in the 20th century, there exists no realistic basis for the formation of a union of African states. But African leaders are unable to forecast the future based on a realistic approach.

The idea of monolithic is one of the wrong notions of the Constitutive Act of the African Union’s desire for regional integration. Africa could not have been monolithic and should not strive to be monolithic. Rather, Africa should strive to manage its plurality. Thus, the full continent-wide integration timetable of 2004 to 2030 is ill-advised, poorly thought out and dead on arrival. By the year 2017, it has become obvious that the much-needed political climate and economic structure to implement the full integration timetable is not there. The integration project has been bedeviled by individualistic micro-national political considerations and narrow commercial interests. It is self-evident that the current crop of leaders on the continent lack a clear vision of the political orientation which Africa should pursue. This is not to even mention the ability to build consensus and ensure that the vision prevails. The problem of Africa remains the lack of political will and courage by the political class to make necessary sacrifices.

Thus, since most international instructions are nothing more than what their members make them to be, the reluctance of African states to make the supranational power of the AU effective gave the organization a technical knockout on arrival. In short, no African leader is willing to work and push for the full implementation of the provisions of the AU. This is to say that nothing has been done or is being done to realize the continental integration objective of the AU. Indeed, a lot has been done, with great challenges. However, sixteen years after the formation of the organization the plan for a supranational AU is yet to go beyond rhetoric. This suggests that the transmutation of Organization of African Unity (OAU) to AU is misplaced as it is based on opinion rather the reality of international relations in Africa.

Bibliography

1. Akinyemi B (2000), Essays on International Politics, Foreign and Domestic Affairs, Macmillan Nigeria Publishers Limited, Lagos.
2. Heywood A (2003), Politics, Palver Publishers, New York.
3. Timothy M Shaw (1982), “Beyond Neo-Colonialism: Varieties of Cooperation in Africa”, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, p. 230.

1. V B Thompson (1969), Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan Africanism, Humanities Press Inc., New York.
2. K Mathews (1968), The Organisation of African Unity in World Politics, London.
3. W O Alli (2011), “Nigeria and the African Union (AU)”, in O Agbu and O Oche (Eds.), Nigeria in the Global Arena: Past, Present and Future, FOG Ventures, Lagos.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. O Aluko (1989), “Nigeria and Organization of African Unity”, in G O Olusanya and R A Akinyemi (Eds.), Nigeria’s External Relations: The First Twenty-five Years, p. 89, University Press Limited, Ibadan.
7. R A Akindele and B E Ate (Eds.) (2000), Selected Readings on Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and International Relations, NIIA and Vantage Publishers, Ibadan.
8. B A Akinterinwa (2005), Nigeria and the Development of African Union, Vantage Publishers, Ibadan.
9. Op. cit., p. 63.
10. A Konare (2007), “Hurdles to Africa’s Integration”, The Guardian, July 10, p. 1.
11. L Agubuzu (2002), “From the OAU to the AU: The Challenge of African Unity and Development in the 21st Century”, Public Lecture Delivered at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), August 26, 2002, Lagos, Nigeria.
12. Ibid., p. 10.
13. D Bukarambe (2004), The Significance of the New South Africa: The Southern Heartland Thesis Reconstructed, College Press and Publishers Ltd., Ibadan.
14. Constitutive Act of the African Union (2002).
15. O Josiah (2009), “Why FG Opposed Formation of AU Government – Madueke”, World News, The Punch, p. 89, Monday, February 9.
16. (Cited in Agubuzu, 2002, p. 9), op. cit.
17. D Swann (1978), The Economics of the Common Market, p. 76, Harmonsworth, London.
18. O Sanu and R I Onwuka (1997), Nigeria – Africa and the European Union: Beyond 2000, p. 7, Dokun, Ibadan.
19. (Quoted in Agubuzu, 2002), op.cit.
20. I W Zarkfiman (1967), “Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations”, International Organisation, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 545-564.